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NOTE
What’s Next?: Missouri’s Medicaid
Expansion after Doyle v. Tidball
Doyle v. Tidball, 625 S.W.3d 459 (Mo. 2021) (en banc).
Jayke Simsheuser*

I. INTRODUCTION
For Autumn Stultza, a single mother suffering from severe tonsil
stones, Melinda Hille, a Type 1 Diabetic forced to choose between eating
and paying for medication, Stephanie Doyle, a mother of three unable to
afford her eczema medications, and approximately 275,000 other
Missourians, August 10, 2021 was a good day.1 More than a decade after
the enactment of the Affordable Care Act and just over a year since
Missourians voted to expand Medicaid, Missourians ages 19 to 65 making
under 138% of the federal poverty level became officially eligible for
Medicaid coverage through the state’s MO HealthNet program.2 Their
excitement, however, may be short-lived.
In Doyle v. Tidball, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that
Medicaid expansion, codified in Article IV, Section 36(c) of the Missouri
Constitution, was validly enacted.3 But, it did so walking a thin and
potentially unstable constitutional line.4 Because the court declined to
fully clarify the extent of the General Assembly’s discretion in funding the

*

B.A., College of the Holy Cross, 2018; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2023; Senior Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2022–2023;
Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2021–2022. I would like to thank Professor
Thomas B. Bennett for his invaluable insight, guidance, and support throughout the
writing of this Note. I would also like to thank the Missouri Law Review staff for their
dedication and thoughtful feedback during the editing process.
1
See Petition for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Doyle v. Tidball, 2021 WL
2629499 (Mo. Cir. Ct.), (No. 21AC-CC00186), 2021 WL 4197488.
2
Doyle v. Tidball, 2021 WL 4205081, *1 (Mo. Cir. Ct.), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, 625 S.W.3d 459 (Mo. 2021) (en banc).
3
Doyle v. Tidball, 625 S.W.3d 459, 460 (Mo. 2021) (en banc).
4
Id. at 460–61.
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program,5 it has left the door open to an underfunded MO HealthNet
system and future constitutional challenges.
Part II of this Note outlines the facts and holding of Doyle. Part III
explains the history of Medicaid and Missouri constitutional challenges
under Article III, Section 51. Part IV then examines the Supreme Court
of Missouri’s reasoning in deciding Doyle. Finally, Part V argues the
court’s holding did not go far enough and may result in eligible
Missourians being denied the very coverage now guaranteed to them in
Article IV, Section 36(c).

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Missouri has long embraced the initiative process, which allows
voters to amend the state constitution directly.6 This process has remained
popular and resulted in the passage of a myriad of large-scale policy
proposals, including demands for increased minimum wage, sanctioning
medical marijuana, campaign financing reform, and more.7
In August 2020, by a vote of 53.25% to 46.75%, Missouri voters
amended the Missouri Constitution to expand Medicaid.8 Before this
expansion, Missouri restricted MO HealthNet coverage to certain
categories of low-income individuals, including “those receiving state
supplement payments for the aged, blind, and disabled; pregnant women;
children under age 19; their custodial parents; and those who [were] 65
and older.”9 After nearly a decade of failed attempts,10 MO HealthNet

5

Id. at 465.
Nicholas R. Theodore, We the People: A Needed Reform of State Initiative and
Referendum Procedures, 78 MO. L. REV. 1401, 1407 (2013) (detailing the early
history of initiative petitions in Missouri); Gunnar Johanson, Note, Indirect Initiative
and Unpopular Referendum in Missouri, 86 MO. L. REV. 625, 630 (2021).
7
Johanson, supra note 6 at 630–31 (listing thirteen separate initiative petitions
approved by Missouri voters between 2006 and 2013).
8
Official Election Results, BD. OF STATE CANVASSERS (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://www.sos.mo.gov/CMSImages/ElectionResultsStatistics/All_Results_2020_Pr
imary_8_4_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/UU4J-L6P6].
9
Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at 460–61; see MO. REV. STAT. § 208.151 (2019).
10
David A. Lieb, Petition seeks to put Medicaid expansion on Missouri ballot,
AP
NEWS
(May
1,
2020),
https://apnews.com/article/aa28ce3a907ed506dc7698ed58770937
[https://perma.cc/M7P4-ZZNS]. In 2012 and 2013, then-Governor Jay Nixon pushed
for Medicaid expansion, but was thwarted by Republican-led efforts to maintain the
status quo. Rudi Keller, Missouri Medicaid Expansion: Will it Bust the Budget or Pay
for Itself?, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIBUNE (last updated Oct. 25, 2020),
https://www.columbiatribune.com/story/news/state/2020/10/23/missouri-medicaidexpansion-bust-budget-pay-itself/3744313001/ [https://perma.cc/7JP6-PJP3]; Kyle
Cheney, Missouri Nixes Medicaid Expansion, POLITICO (May 8, 2013),
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/missouri-lawmakers-torpedo-medicaid6
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eligibility drastically expanded to include individuals between ages 19 and
65 with household incomes up to 138% of the federal poverty level.11
In addition to covering 275,000 more Missourians,12 Article IV,
Section 36(c) declares qualifying Missourians “shall be eligible for
medical assistance under MO HealthNet and shall receive coverage for the
health services package.”13 The amendment also required the Department
of Social Services (“DSS”) to “submit all state plan amendments necessary
to implement this section to the United States Department of Health and
Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services” by
March 1, 2021, and to “take all actions necessary to maximize federal
financial participation in funding medical assistance pursuant to this
section.”14
Despite the mandate, members of the Missouri legislature intensely
debated and resisted funding the program.15 Notwithstanding a significant
expansion-091040 [https://perma.cc/QZ6P-KLT4]. In 2014, SB 661 was introduced
to expand Medicaid in step with the ACA, but failed to make it out of committee. SB
661, 97th General Assembly, (Mo. 2014), https://www.senate.mo.gov/14info/
BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=28098253
[https://perma.cc/KSB6W822]. Again in 2015, SB 90 was introduced to expand MO Healthnet, but died in
committee.
SB
90,
98th
General
Assembly
(Mo.
2015),
https://www.senate.mo.gov/15info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=23
[https://perma.cc/M53M-MKCD]. In 2016, another effort to expand MO HealthNet
was defeated in committee. SB 648, 98th General Assembly (Mo. 2016),
https://www.senate.mo.gov/16info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=22
246558 [https://perma.cc/N69Y-UNXF]. More successful attempts occurred in 2019
and 2020. See SB 27, 100th General Assembly (Mo. 2019),
https://www.senate.mo.gov/19info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=94
[https://perma.cc/4NNP-HJQN]; SB 104, 100th General Assembly (Mo. 2019),
https://www.senate.mo.gov/19info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=40
[https://perma.cc/6XTQ-HF4P]; SB 564, 100th General Assembly (Mo. 2020),
https://www.senate.mo.gov/20info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=26
838066 [https://perma.cc/WZP3-AXWN].
11
Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at 461; MO. CONST. art. IV, § 36(c).
12
Brief for Missouri House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 11, Doyle v. Tidball, 625 S.W.3d 459 (Mo. 2021) (No. SC 99185),
2021WL 3173695.
13
MO. CONST. art. IV, § 36(c) (emphasis added). When interpreting
constitutional language, Missouri courts have stressed the importance of giving the
language its plain meaning. See, e.g., Richards v. Treasurer of Missouri, 179 S.W.3d
299, 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). The usage of the word “shall” in constitutional
language is significant and its plain meaning “connotes a mandatory duty.” McAlister
v. Shrohmeyer, 395 S.W.3d 546, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting St. Louis Police
Officers' Ass'n v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs of City of St. Louis, 259 S.W.3d 526, 528
(Mo. 2008) (en banc)).
14
MO. CONST. art. IV, § 36(c).
15
Kurt Erickson, Missouri Senate Rejects Funding for Medicaid Expansion, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govtand-politics/missouri-senate-rejects-funding-for-medicaid-
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budget surplus estimated at $1.1 billion, many Republican members
contended that the state could not handle the long-term financial impacts
of Medicaid expansion.16 Even amid a groundswell of support and claims
that expansion could actually spur a boon to the Missouri economy,17 some
Republicans argued that their constituents were misled as to the financial
effects of Medicaid expansion and vowed to “protect them from that lie.”18
Despite legislative resistance, a plan was submitted in compliance
with the Section 36(c) mandate.19 However, that plan was eventually
withdrawn by DSS, citing a lack of adequate funding from the General
Assembly.20 DSS announced it could not provide coverage to the newly
eligible population because the General Assembly failed to appropriate
funds specifically for those individuals.21 According to DSS, House Bills
10 and 11 – the appropriation bills funding MO HealthNet Fiscal Year
2022 – “implicitly . . . require[d] that none of the appropriated funds be
used to provide coverage or services to individuals who would be eligible
for MO HealthNet only pursuant to article IV, section 36(c).”22 DSS
contended that the General Assembly, relying in part on the United States
Supreme Court’s line-drawing between pre-expansion and post-expansion
Medicaid,23 intended to fund only the pre-expansion population.24 In light
of DSS’s interpretation and the General Assembly’s apparent intent,
expansion/article_33249172-2601-51ff-b4fd-4ff541ed3331.html
[https://perma.cc/AZU8-DJHS].
16
Sebastian Martinez Valdivia, Missouri Legislature Tries To Back Out Of
Voter-Approved
Medicaid
Expansion,
NPR
(Apr.
8,
2021),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/04/08/985033020/missourilegislature-tries-to-back-out-of-voter-approved-medicaid-expansion
[https://perma.cc/GDP4-FCKS].
17
See New Impact Report Shows Broad Economic Benefits to Medicaid
Expansion in Missouri, MO. FOUND. FOR HEALTH (Jun. 9, 2020),
https://mffh.org/news/new-impact-report-shows-broad-economic-benefits-tomedicaid-expansion-in-missouri/ [https://perma.cc/62QZ-WFL4]; Andrew D. Martin
and David H. Perlmutter, Support for Medicaid Expansion in Missouri, WASHINGTON
UNIV. IN ST. LOUIS, OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR (June 23, 2020),
https://andrewdmartin.wustl.edu/support-for-medicaid-expansion-in-missouri/
[https://perma.cc/Q334-DRJ2].
18
Valdivia, supra note 16.
19
Doyle v. Tidball, 625 S.W.3d 459, 461 (Mo. 2021) (en banc).
20
Id.
21
Id. at 465.
22
Id.
23
See Brief of the Missouri House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Doyle v. Tidball, 625 S.W.3d 459 (Mo. 2021) (en banc) (No.
SC 99185), 2021 WL 3173695 at *22 (citing Chief Justice Robert’s language
describing Medicaid expansion under the ACA as “a shift in kind, not merely of
degree” resulting in a “new health care program.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012)).
24
Id. at *22–32.
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Missouri Governor Michael L. Parson withdrew the expansion plan,
noting that “[w]ithout a revenue source of funding authority from the
General Assembly, we are unable to proceed with the expansion at this
time. . . .”25
Plaintiffs Autumn Stultz, Melinda Hille, and Stephanie Doyle, each
newly eligible for Medicaid under expansion, filed suit against DSS after
it announced its intent not to proceed with expansion.26 They claimed they
were eligible for and entitled to coverage through MO HealthNet and
sought: “(1) a declaratory judgment stating DSS’ decision to refuse to
extend benefits violate[d] article IV, section 36(c); and (2) an injunction
requiring DSS and MO HealthNet to take the steps necessary to implement
article IV, section 36(c), which include[d] re-filing the state plan
amendment.”27
The circuit court focused its analysis on whether Article IV, Section
36(c) violated another provision of the Missouri Constitution,28 Article III,
Section 51, which explicitly prohibits initiatives that appropriate funds not
raised by the initiative itself.29 Effectively, this provision prohibits
Missouri voters from passing initiatives that are not self-funding or that
remove the General Assembly’s discretion to use its appropriations
power.30
The circuit court found that Article IV, Section 36(c) created a new
class of 275,000 eligible Missourians, an obligation on Missouri to cover
at least 10% of the cost of the new population’s benefits, and an estimated
$1.8 million in expansion costs.31 However, the court also found that
Becky Sullivan, Missouri Will Not Expand Medicaid Despite Voter’s Wishes,
Governor
Says,
NPR
(May
13,
2021,
3:32
PM
ET),
https://www.npr.org/2021/05/13/996611586/missouri-will-not-expand-medicaiddespite-voters-wishes-governor-says [https://perma.cc/7Y29-QLUE].
26
Complaint at 11, Doyle v. Tidball, 2021 WL 2629499 (Mo. Cir. Ct.) (No.
21AC-CC00186).
27
Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at 461.
28
See Doyle v. Tidball, 2021 WL 2629499, *2–3 (Mo. Cir. Ct.), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 625 S.W.3d 459 (Mo. 2021) (en banc). A finding that Article IV,
Section 36(c) violated Article III, Section 51 would render the amendment
unconstitutional. Brief of the Missouri House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Doyle v. Tidball, 625 S.W.3d 459 (No. SC 99185), 2021 WL
3173695 at *12. While the Missouri Constitution grants the people the power to amend
the constitution, “[t]he people, speaking with equal vigor through the same
constitution, have placed limitations on the initiative power.” Missourians to Protect
the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).
29
MO. CONST. art. III, § 51 (“The initiative shall not be used for the appropriation
of money other than of new revenues created and provided for thereby, or for any
other purpose prohibited by this constitution.”).
30
Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at 464.
31
Doyle v. Tidball, 2021 WL 2629499, *2 (Mo. Cir. Ct.), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, 625 S.W.3d 459 (Mo. 2021) (en banc). (“The effect of the actual application
25
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Article IV, Section 36(c) did not create its own source of funding.32
Rather, the court reasoned that Article IV, Section 36(c) implicitly
required the General Assembly to appropriate additional funds for
Medicaid expansion.33 Thus, the court “determined the initiative that
resulted in article IV, section 36(c) violated article III, section 51 of the
Missouri Constitution and, therefore, was never effective.”34 Because of
Article IV, Section 36(c)’s “shall be eligible. . . and shall receive”
language, the court found that the General Assembly would have no choice
but to maintain a Medicaid program and fund its expansion.35 As such,
the circuit court held in favor of the defendants on all claims.36
After some confusion on where to file,37 plaintiffs appealed directly
to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which exercised exclusive appellate
jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3 of the Missouri Constitution.38
Concluding that nothing in Article IV, Section 36(c) deprived the General
Assembly of its appropriation discretion, the court held that the
amendment did not violate Article III, Section 51 and was, therefore,
effective.39

of Amendment 2 is as follows: 1) Amendment 2 creates a class of 275,000 new
eligibles for MO HealthNet Benefits; 2) The State will bear at least 10% of the cost of
those benefits; and 3) The estimated cost for such expansion is 1.8 million dollars. The
Missouri Constitution provides that state revenues may not be expended without an
appropriation.”).
32
Id. at *2 n.4.
33
The court acknowledged the plain effect of Article IV, Section 36(c). Doyle,
625 S.W.3d at 466. In the face of a Missouri constitutional guarantee of Medicaid
coverage (if the state continued to have a Medicaid program at all), the General
Assembly was left with no other option than to fund the expanded Medicaid program.
Id. at 461. Although the Supreme Court of Missouri later rejected this plain
understanding of Section 36(c), the court here recognized that Section 36(c)
“indirectly requires the appropriation of revenues not created by the initiative and is
therefore unconstitutional under Article III, section 51 of the Missouri Constitution.”
Doyle, 2021 WL 2629499 at *3.
34
Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at 462.
35
Doyle, 2021 WL 2629499, at *2–3 (emphasis added).
36
Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at 462.
37
Professor Thomas B. Bennett (@Tommy_Bennett), TWITTER (Jun. 23, 2021,
3:33
PM),
https://twitter.com/tommy_bennett/status/1407799064717058057
[https://perma.cc/JP8T-N4D9].
38
Id.; MO. CONST. art. V, § 3 (“The supreme court shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction in all cases involving the validity of . . . a provision of the constitution of
this state. . .”).
39
Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at 465 (The court also held that the circuit court did not
err in overruling intervenors motion to intervene as of right).
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Medicaid maintains a fickle position in American healthcare and
politics. On one hand, Medicaid is the primary vehicle to healthcare for
over 75 million Americans.40 On the other, the program – and particularly
its expansion – remains a source of sharp criticism from Republican and
right-wing politicians.41 As states like Missouri have sought to extend the
program after the passage of the Affordable Care Act, they have been met
with a frenzy of political and legal attacks.42 To better understand the
development of Medicaid in Missouri and the legal challenges to its
expansion under Article IV, Section 36(c), this Part examines the history
of both MO HealthNet and challenges to it under Article III, Section 51.
Specifically, this Part first discusses the history of Medicaid, subsequent
legislative acts affecting the program, and the program’s current impact in
Missouri. Next, it examines the history of Article III, Section 51
challenges in Missouri and the Supreme Court of Missouri’s approach to
citizen-led initiatives.

A. Medicaid and Subsequent Legislative Acts
Since its enactment under Title XIX of the Social Security Act,43
Medicaid has become a central facet of American healthcare.44 The public
insurance program gives federal funding to states that provide medical

40

February 2022 Medicaid & CHIP Enrollment Data Highlights,
MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-information/medicaidand-chip-enrollment-data/report-highlights/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3DE9RAP7] (last visited Jun. 3, 2022).
41
For example, despite the improved health outcomes associated with Medicaid
expansion and increased federal funding under the Biden administration, Republicans
like Wyoming State Senator Troy McKeown (R-WY) criticize Medicaid expansion as
“penalizing hardworking Americans to make sure everyone gets a program” and
moving American healthcare “closer to one-payer health care.” Sarah Kliff,
Obamacare’s Survival Is Now Assured, but It Still Has One Big Problem, N.Y. TIMES
(Jun. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/upshot/medicaid-expansiondemocrats-obamacare.html [https://perma.cc/CH5R-3KQJ].
42
See e.g., Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at 459.
43
Title XIX, Public Law 89–97, 1965 amendments to the Federal Social
Security Act. Interestingly enough, Medicaid was signed into law by President
Lyndon B. Johnson in Independence, Missouri at the Harry S. Truman Library on July
30, 1965. Remarks with President Truman at the Signing in Independence of the
Medicare Bill, July 30, 1965, LBJ PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY (Jul. 30, 1965),
https://www.lbjlibrary.org/object/text/remarks-president-truman-signingindependence-medicare-bill-07-30-1965 [https://perma.cc/JAZ2-LMUH]. President
Truman, in fact, was in attendance. Id.
44
Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid, Health Policy Report, N ENGL J MED, Vol. 346,
No. 8, 635, 636 (Feb. 21, 2002).
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insurance for some of its neediest populations.45 Although state
participation is voluntary, every state in the country has elected to
participate since 1982.46 Missouri was quick to adopt the program and has
continuously participated since 1967.47 With 75 million Americans,
including one in every six Missourians (before Article IV, Section 36(c)),
receiving benefits under Medicaid through state programs, Medicaid’s
importance is difficult to overstate.48
The program is jointly funded by federal and state governments but
is run largely at the direction of the states.49 As long as a state’s Medicaid
program meets the minimum federal standards, it receives federal funding
as determined by the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (“FMAP”).50
Generally speaking, a state’s wealth relative to the rest of the country
determines its FMAP apportionment.51 FMAPs range between 50% and
83%,52 with Missouri at 66.36%.53
While Medicaid coverage was originally limited to “pregnant
women, children, needy families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled,”
the 2010 passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”) dramatically expanded the program’s reach.54 The ACA,
Id. at 635−36 (“There are two basic criteria for eligibility: financial need (as
evidenced by low income or impoverishment due to high medical bills) and a federally
recognized eligibility category (e.g., a household with dependent children, an age of
65 years or older, and disability). Both criteria must be met for enrollment.”).
46
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 542 (2012).
47
Mo. Found. for Health, Missouri Medicaid Basics (Spring 2019),
https://mffh.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/2018-Missouri-Medicaid-Basicsweb.pdf [https://perma.cc/68Z5-G8UK].
48
Feb. 2022 Medicaid & CHIP Enrollment Data Highlights, supra note 40.
49
Policy Basics: Introduction to Medicaid, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y
PRIORITIES, (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
policybasics-medicaid_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/A55W-YQ4W].
50
Matching rates, MEDICAID AND CHIP PAYMENT AND ACCESS COMM’N,
https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/matching-rates/
[https://perma.cc/R2S3-22D8]
(last visited Apr. 23, 2022).
51
Keller, supra note 10. To encourage compliance with the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion mandate, the federal government would reimburse state governments for
90% of costs associated with expansion. Federal Financial Participation in State
Assistance Expenditures; Federal Matching Shares for Medicaid, the Children's
Health Insurance Program, and Aid to Needy Aged, Blind, or Disabled Persons for
October 1, 2021 Through September 30, 2022, 85 Fed. Reg. 76586, 76587 (Nov. 30,
2020) [hereinafter Federal Financial Participation].
52
Medicaid’s Federal Medicaid Assistance Percentage (FMAP), CONG. RSCH.
SERV.,
(Jul.
29,
2020),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R43847.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2MC-J2BT].
53
85 Fed. Reg. 76588 (Nov. 30, 2020).
54
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 541–42 (2012); see also
Olena Mazurenko et al., The Effects of Medicaid Expansion Under The ACA: A
Systematic Review, 37(6) HEALTH AFFAIRS 944, 944 (2018).
45
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commonly referred to as “Obamacare,” aimed to provide affordable health
care to millions of Americans.55 The implications of the ACA were broad
but focused on: (1) guaranteed access to insurance for individuals with
pre-existing conditions; (2) reduction of insurance premiums by use of
community-based pricing; (3) mandated purchase of insurance for
individuals; (4) access to essential benefits without additional payments;
and (5) Medicaid eligibility expansion.56 The ACA originally required
participating states to expand state Medicaid eligibility criteria to include
“nonelderly adults with incomes up to 138 percent of the federal poverty
level” or risk losing all federal Medicaid funds.57 Mandated expansion
was met with stern resistance and subjected to several constitutional
challenges,58 which were ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court of the
United States in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
(“NFIB”).59
In NFIB, a fractured Supreme Court considered whether mandatory
Medicaid expansion fell within Congress’s constitutional spending
power.60 The Court ultimately held that the mandatory expansion was
unconstitutional because Congress exceeded the scope of its power when
it conditioned all Medicaid funding on a state’s agreement to drastically
expand Medicaid coverage.61 Rather than completely striking down the
ACA’s Medicaid Expansion provision, however, the Court declared that
states must comply with the ACA’s expansion criteria only if they choose
to accept the additional funds offered by the federal government.62 In
other words, while there is no penalty for refusing to expand, additional
federal funding through the ACA is made available only to those states

55

Namrata Uberoi et al., Issue Brief: Health Insurance Coverage and the
Affordable Care Act, 2010−16, ASPE (Mar. 3, 2016) (estimating twenty million
previously uninsured adults gained access to coverage because of the ACA by 2016).
56
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 538–40.
57
Mazurenko, supra note 54.
58
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 530–31.
59
Id. at 585. The Court also addressed other constitutional challenges, including
whether the individual mandate was a valid use of Congress’s powers. Id. at 546–47.
60
Id. at 585; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”) (emphasis added).
61
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 583 (The court reasoned that the
mandate represented a “shift in kind, not merely degree” in that the ACA conditioned
both the “new” and the “old” funding on a state’s expansion of Medicaid. Such a shift
exceeded the Congress’s spending power.).
62
Id. at 587–88 (Despite finding that the expansion mandate was
unconstitutional, the court found thrust of the act “need not fall in light of [the Court’s]
constitutional holding.”).
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which agree to expand their Medicaid programs to the newly eligible
populations.63
Despite Medicaid’s nationwide presence, its expansion has met
significant resistance among the states.64 Currently, thirty-eight states and
the District of Columbia have expanded or started expanding Medicaid.65
Much of the concern for non-expansion states has related to increased
costs associated with expansion—a concern that seems warranted given
that the estimated cost per enrollee was $6,366 as of 2015.66 At least in
part, however, that apprehension is ameliorated by the ACA’s federal
reimbursement for expansion states.67 As of 2020, and for as long as the
ACA remains in effect in its current form, the federal government
reimburses ninety percent of Medicaid expansion costs incurred by the
states.68
Recently, Congress enacted increased financial incentives for states
to expand Medicaid.69 Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress passed
the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (“FFCRA”) and the
American Rescue Plan Act (“ARPA”). The FFCRA increased FMAP for
expansion states by 6.2% if states met the statutory requirements detailed
in the Act.70 Under the ARPA, states covering eligible individuals in the
ACA expansion group receive an additional 5% FMAP increase on top of
63

Id.
So much so, thirteen states filed suit in the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Florida the very same day President Obama signed the ACA into
law. Id. at 540.
65
Feb. 2022 Medicaid & CHIP Enrollment Data Highlights, supra note 40.
66
See e.g., Valdivia, supra note 16 (detailing Rep. Cody Smith, a Republican
member of the General Assembly, statement on concerns on Medicaid expansion’s
impact on the state budget); Brian C. Blasé, Evidence Is Mounting: The Affordable
Care Act Has Worsened Medicaid’s Structural Problems, MERCATUS CENTER AT
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY (2016) (citing CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES, 2015 Actuarial Report on the Financial Outlook of Medicaid, at 27).
67
Federal Financial Participation, supra note 51.
68
Id. (noting the reimbursement rate for 2014–16 would be 100%, gradually
declining to 90% in 2020, where it remains indefinitely).
69
Missouri Medicaid Expansion Brings Quality Essential Health Coverage to
More than 275,000 Missourians, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES
(Oct. 4, 2021), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/missouri-medicaidexpansion-brings-quality-essential-health-coverage-more-275000-missourians
[https://perma.cc/UME3-FJZQ].
70
Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. 116-127, § 6008(a) (2020);
Medicaid CMS-64 FFCRA Increased FMAP Expenditure Data Collected through
MBES,
MEDICAID.GOV,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/financialmanagement/state-budget-expenditure-reporting-for-medicaid-and-chip/expenditurereports-mbescbes/medicaid-cms-64-ffcra-increased-fmap-expenditure-datacollected-through-mbes/index.html [https://perma.cc/SZT9-DFSU] (last visited Apr.
24, 2022). This increase, however, only lasted during the emergency period (through
March 2022). Id.
64
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the 6.2% increase provided in the FFCRA.71 Federal incentives for
Medicaid expansion could be significant in Missouri, with the state
standing to receive an additional $968 million over the next two years in
federal funding.72
The federal government’s incentivization of Medicaid expansion has
been nothing short of immense. Covering nearly all costs of expansion
and increasing other federal reimbursements,73 the government has given
states ample reason to expand. Despite this, some states have been
resistant.74 Missouri is no exception.75 Only after multiple failed attempts
to expand Medicaid following the passage of the ACA and a direct
amendment of the state constitution was Missouri able to expand its MO
HealthNet program.76

B. Article III, Section 51 and Prior Missouri Challenges to Initiatives
In 2020, Missouri voters exercised their constitutional right to
directly amend the Missouri Constitution by passing then-Amendment 2
—now codified as Article IV, Section 36(c).77 Generally, the initiative
petition process operates as a popular referendum proposed and voted on
directly by the citizens.78 While Missourians “reserve power to propose
and enact or reject laws and amendments to the constitution,” that power
is not limitless.79
The most pertinent of these restrictions is Article III, Section 51,
which states in relevant part, “[t]he initiative shall not be used for the
appropriation of money other than of new revenues created and provided
for thereby, or for any other purpose prohibited by this constitution.”80 In
71

Missouri Medicaid Expansion Brings Quality Essential Health Coverage to
More than 275,000 Missourians, supra note 69.
72
Id.
73
Robin Rudowitz et al., New Incentive for States to Adopt the ACA Medicaid
Expansion: Implications for State Spending, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Mar. 17, 2021),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/new-incentive-for-states-to-adopt-the-acamedicaid-expansion-implications-for-state-spending/
[https://perma.cc/A4FWL3AR].
74
States that have not yet expanded Medicaid include: Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Wisconsin, Wyoming, Tennessee, and Texas. Status of State Medicaid Expansion
Decisions: Interactive Map, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2021),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansiondecisions-interactive-map/ [https://perma.cc/6CW8-8GGW].
75
Id.
76
Keller, supra note 10.
77
MO. CONST. art. IV, § 36(c); BD. OF STATE CANVASSERS, supra note 8.
78
MO. CONST. art. IV, § 49.
79
Id.
80
Id. § 51.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 15

896

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

other words, this provision ensures that the initiative petition process does
not overtake the General Assembly’s “virtually unbounded” power to
appropriate state funds unless an initiative raises sufficient new revenues
on its own.81 Practically, this makes sense. Appropriation decisions, in
theory at least, are better trusted to the General Assembly, which is more
informed on the state budget than the general public.
Article III, Section 51 challenges are scarcely litigated in Missouri
courts.82 When brought, however, these challenges have typically
involved initiative petitions that proposed city ordinances with the
“evident purpose and effect” of removing the appropriation discretion
from local governments.83 Generally, Missouri courts have held that
initiative petitions which expressly or, in some cases, implicitly force a
City legislative body to appropriate funds violate Article III, Section 51.84
In Kansas City v. McGee, for example, the Supreme Court of
Missouri concluded that an initiative petition violated Article III, Section
51 where it proposed an ordinance to create a firemen’s pension plan.85
The ordinance explicitly required the City Council to make periodic
payments into the pension plan in the amount requested by the trustees.86
While the defendants contended that the ordinance was not an
appropriations bill, and thus not subject to Article III, Section 51, the court
noted that it would “take from the City Council the control over the
finances of the City.”87 Because the ordinance forced the City Council’s
hand and removed its discretion in the appropriation of city funds, the
court held that the ordinance violated Article III, Section 51.88
The Supreme Court of Missouri faced a similar issue in State ex rel
Card v. Kaufman.89 There, the court considered an appeal of an issuance
of a permanent writ of mandamus “requiring a mayor and city council to
submit to voters a proposed amendment to the city charter.”90 The
proposed amendment would have required that University City Fire
Department employee salaries match or exceed those of employees of the
Fire Department of St. Louis.91 Although the proposed amendment did
81

Seay v. Jones, 439 S.W.3d 881, 890 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014).
See Westlaw Notes of Decisions on MO. CONST. art. III, § 51 (citing 23 cases
decided on this provision).
83
Boeving v. Kander, 496 S.W.3d 498, 510 n.6 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
84
Doyle v. Tidball, 625 S.W.3d 459, 463–64 (Mo. 2021) (en banc).
85
Id. at 463.
86
Kansas City v. McGee, 269 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Mo. 1954) (“The ordinance
[said that] the Council shall appropriate the amount asked for by the trustees
administering the pension plan.”).
87
Id. at 665.
88
Id. at 666.
89
State ex rel Card v. Kaufman, 517 S.W.2d 78, 79 (Mo. 1974).
90
Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at 464.
91
Kaufman, 517 S.W.2d at 79.
82
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not explicitly require the City to appropriate a specific amount of money
to Fire Department salaries, the court concluded that “it le[ft] no discretion
to the city manager or the city council and in effect [was] an appropriation
measure.”92 Because of the initiative petition’s potential effect on the
City’s appropriation discretion, the court ruled that the proposed measure
would have violated Article III, Section 51 and reversed the issuance of a
permanent writ of mandamus.93
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court of Missouri took up
whether a local tax law violated Article III, Section 51.94 In City of Kansas
City v. Chastain, a proposed initiative imposed two new sales taxes to fund
the construction of a light rail system and other public transportation
developments.95 The initiative generally instructed the legislature to spend
the funds for public transportation.96 But, it neither explicitly appropriated
funds for a specific purpose nor committed the City to any particular
project or development.97 Unlike Kaufman and McGee, this proposed
initiative involved raising new revenues via sales taxes.98 The court
synthesized its prior holdings, noting that “[w]hat is prohibited is an
initiative that, either expressly or through practical necessity, requires the
appropriation of funds to cover the costs associated with the ordinance.”99
The court pointed to the proposed initiative’s new revenue sources and
lack of explicit instruction to support its contention that the initiative
imposed “no unfunded financial obligations on the city either expressly or
through practical necessity.”100 As such, the proposed initiative did not
violate Article III, Section 51.101
While rare, Missouri courts have also reviewed Article III, Section 51
challenges before a state-wide election.102 In Cady v. Ashcroft, the
Missouri Court of Appeals weighed in on the constitutionality of Medicaid
expansion embodied in then-Amendment 2 before the August 2020
election.103 The court noted that pre-election challenges to initiative
92

Id. at 80 (emphasis added).
Id. at 81–82.
94
See City of Kansas Citv. Chastain, 420 S.W.3d 550 (Mo. 2014) (en banc).
95
Id. at 553–54.
96
Id. at 556.
97
Id. at 557 (Wilson, J., concurring).
98
Id. at 556 (majority opinion). See also Kaufman, 517 S.W.2d at 79; Kansas
City v. McGee, 269 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Mo. 1954).
99
Chastain, 420 S.W.3d at 555 (emphasis added).
100
Id. at 556.
101
Id.
102
See e.g., Boeving v. Kander, 496 S.W.3d 498 (Mo. 2016) (en banc); Cady v.
Ashcroft, 606 S.W.3d 659, 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020); Chastain, 420 S.W.3d at 554–
55.
103
Cady, 606 S.W.3d at 664–65. Amendment 2 would go on to become MO.
CONST., art. IV, § 36(c).
93
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petitions are limited and primarily focus on whether an initiative has been
properly placed before voters.104 Particularly in cases involving Article
51, the court described the pivotal question as whether the initiative
facially appropriates previously existing funds.105 The court also noted
that it is required to harmonize the initiative to the extent possible with the
Missouri Constitution rather than create an irreconcilable conflict when it
conducts a pre-election review.106 Thus, the court was limited to reviewing
whether then-Amendment 2 satisfied the petition requirements and
whether it blatantly violated Article III, Section 51 on its face.107
Despite the amendment’s mandate that eligible individuals shall be
eligible and shall receive MO HealthNet benefits, the court contended that
the initiative did not direct or restrict the “General Assembly’s ability to
change the amount of appropriations for the MO HealthNet program or to
increase or decrease funding for the program based on health-care-related
costs.”108 Ultimately, it saw the appellants’ Article 51 arguments as
focusing on what then-Amendment 2 “will or may do if approved by the
voters and put into operation, not to whether the Proposed Measure is
properly put before the voters.”109 Seemingly, the court reasoned that this
interpretation harmonized the otherwise irreconcilable conflict between
the proposed amendment and Article III, Section 51 by leaving to the
General Assembly the discretion to fund Article IV, Section 36(c)’s
guarantee.110 After the court determined there were no threshold defects
or anything in then-Amendment 2 that facially violated Article III,
Section 51, it affirmed the lower court’s judgment and deferred the
assessment of Medicaid expansion’s constitutionality until after the
measure passed.111

104

Id. at 666–67 (quoting City of Kansas City v. Kansas City Board of Election
Commissioners, 505 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Mo. 2017) (en banc)) (“[P]re-election
challenges are limited to claims that the procedures for submitting a proposal to the
voters were not followed.”); Id. at 668 (quoting Chastain, 420 S.W.3d at 554–55) (“In
Chastain, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the trial court had been authorized ‘to
conduct pre-election review of the facial constitutionality of an initiative petition’
because the issue was whether the proposed ordinance was plainly ‘an
unconstitutional appropriation ordinance under article III, section 51 of the Missouri
Constitution.’”).
105
Id.
106
Id. at 665 (citing Comm. for a Healthy Future, Inc. v. Carnahan, 201 S.W.3d
503, 507 (Mo. 2006) (en banc)); Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Jackson Cnty. v. Jackson
Cnty., 936 S.W.2d 102, 103–04 (Mo. 1996) (en banc); Missourians to Protect the
Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).
107
Cady, 606 S.W.3d at 667.
108
Id. at 668.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 668–69.
111
Id. at 668.
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Missouri’s Article III, Section 51 jurisprudence, especially after
Cady, lacked a clear precedent for future courts to follow. In truth, it is no
clearer today. However, Missouri caselaw seems to suggest that where an
initiative petition explicitly or implicitly commandeers the legislature’s
appropriation discretion, it is constitutionally defective.112 The line
between a constitutional guarantee and legislative discretion, however, is
difficult to discern. This tension was at the forefront of the Supreme Court
of Missouri’s discussion in Doyle v. Tidball.113

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Doyle v. Tidball, a unanimous Supreme Court of Missouri vacated
the circuit court’s decision to invalidate Article IV, Section 36(c).114
Reviewing the matter de novo,115 the court began its analysis by defining
the scope of Article III, Section 51’s prohibition against appropriation-byinitiative.116 The court explained that “what article III, section 51 prohibits
is an initiative that authorizes the expenditure and disbursement of a
specified amount for a specified purpose without providing new revenue,”
including one which “deprives the General Assembly of discretion and
requires it to appropriate money for the initiative’s purposes.”117
The court’s analysis was straightforward. Because Article IV,
Section 36(c) contained no explicit “stand appropriated” language or other
similar phrase, the focus was on whether the amendment disrupted the
General Assembly’s discretion to appropriate state funds.118 The court
noted that an initiative may still violate Article III, Section 51 – even
where it does not expressly use the word “appropriation” – if it requires
the General Assembly to appropriate a specified amount for the initiative’s
purpose.119 Distinguishing the case from McGee, Kaufman, and Chastain,
the court determined that the General Assembly was not deprived of its
discretion to “decide whether and to what extent it [would] appropriate
money to MO HealthNet programs.”120
In other words, the court concluded that the General Assembly
remained free to opt in or out of Medicaid and appropriate whatever funds
112

See e.g., City of Kansas City. Chastain, 420 S.W.3d 550, 556 (Mo. 2014) (en

banc).
113

Doyle v. Tidball, 625 S.W.3d 459, 467 (Mo. 2021) (en banc).
Id. at 460–65. The Supreme Court of Missouri also affirmed the circuit
court’s overruling of proposed intervenors motion to intervene as a matter of right. Id.
at 462.
115
Id. at 463 (citing Peters v. Johns, 489 S.W.3d 262, 266 (Mo. 2016) (en banc)).
116
Id. at 463–64.
117
Id. at 463.
118
Id. at 464–65.
119
Id. at 465.
120
Id.
114
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it deemed necessary to fund MO HealthNet.121 With no violation of
Article III, Section 51, the court overruled the circuit court’s decision and
held Article IV, Section 36(c) valid and enforceable.122
The court also held that DSS’s interpretation of House Bills 10 and 11
– that the General Assembly’s intention to fund only the pre-expansion
population prevented DSS from disbursing funds for coverage of the
newly eligible population under Article IV, Section 36(c) – was invalid.123
Despite the contentions that the General Assembly only appropriated
funds to pre-expansion eligible Missourians,124 the court found no
“limitation against using the funds appropriated to provide coverage or
services to individuals eligible under only Article IV, Section 36(c).”125 In
reaching its conclusion, the court interpreted the plain language of House
Bills 10 and 11 and held that the “amounts appropriated and other extrinsic
evidence cannot be used to alter the plain language of the purposes
stated—to fund MO HealthNet without distinguishing between benefits
provided to individuals who are eligible as part of the pre-expansion
population and those eligible only under Art. IV, Section 36(c).”126 In
rejecting DSS’s interpretation that the General Assembly only meant to
appropriate funds for previously eligible Missourians, the court held DSS
was required to disburse funds and services, so long as Missouri has a
Medicaid program, to all eligible enrollees, regardless of when they
became eligible.127
The court vacated the circuit court’s judgment as to the
constitutionality of Article IV, Section 36(c) and remanded the case to the
circuit court with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiffs.128

V. COMMENT
Following the Supreme Court of Missouri’s ruling in Doyle v.
Tidball, media outlets championed the decision as the final word on
Missouri’s Medicaid expansion.129 The battle, however, is likely far from
121

Id.
Id.
123
Id. at 465–66.
124
Brief for Missouri House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, supra note 12.
125
Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at 465.
126
Id. at 466.
127
Id. at 466−67.
128
Id. at 467.
129
See, e.g., Jim Salter and Summer Ballentine, Missouri Supreme Court
reverses Medicaid Expansion Decision, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, (July 22, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/courts-michael-brown-medicaid3690befde29aa1b27406a3472fb566aa [https://perma.cc/24AK-UB39]; Tami Luhby,
Missouri Supreme Court rules in favor of Medicaid expansion, CNN, (July 22, 2021),
122
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over. Despite its declaration that Article IV, Section 36(c) passed
constitutional muster, the court did not reach the attendant question of
what would happen to eligible Missourians if the General Assembly, in its
discretion, underfunded MO HealthNet.130 This decision may prove
injurious to newly eligible populations and MO HealthNet moving
forward.
On its face, it is difficult to reconcile how Medicaid expansion does
not require, at least implicitly, the General Assembly to appropriate
significant funds toward an expanded MO HealthNet. The expansion,
covering 275,000 newly eligible Missourians, is reported to cost the state
upwards of $130 million annually after federal reimbursement.131 This
leaves Missourians questioning how Section 36(c) cannot plainly force the
General Assembly to appropriate additional funds to the MO HealthNet
Program.
While the court correctly pointed out that an initiative does not
violate Article III, Section 51 simply because an expenditure arises from
its passage, its application of this principle to Article IV, Section 36(c) is
misplaced.132 Costs related to expanding MO HealthNet are not merely
incidental. Rather, they are necessary components of Article IV,
Section 36(c)’s mandate. The court’s prior jurisprudence has made clear
that Article III, Section 51 prohibits initiatives that either explicitly or
implicitly force the General Assembly to appropriate funds to a given
initiative.133 Because Article IV, Section 36(c) contains no explicit “shall
stand appropriated” language, the salient question becomes whether it
removes – either explicitly or implicitly – the General Assembly’s
appropriation discretion.134 The text of Article IV, Section 36(c)’s
mandate is clear: Missourians between the ages of 19 and 65, with
household income up to 138% of the federal poverty level, “shall be
eligible for medical assistance under MO HealthNet and shall receive

https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/22/politics/missouri-medicaid-expansioncourt/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q9ME-NMUX].
130
In fact, the court explicitly chose not to answer the question. Doyle, 625
S.W.3d at 467 n.4 (“The consequences of whether and how much to appropriate for
any particular purpose from the nearly $33 billion at the General Assembly's disposal
can – and nearly always will – weigh heavily in the General Assembly's deliberations.
But, those considerations – like the decisions themselves – belong to the General
Assembly and not to this Court, and the consequences of appropriations that turn out
to be less than the full cost of MO HealthNet for FY 2022 are not before the Court in
this case.”).
131
Luhby, supra note 129.
132
Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at 463–65.
133
See e.g., Kansas City v. McGee, 269 S.W.2d 662, 662 (Mo. 1954); State ex
rel Card v. Kaufman, 517 S.W.2d 78, 78 (Mo. 1974); City of Kansas City v. Chastain,
420 S.W.3d 550, 553 (Mo. 2014) (en banc).
134
Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at 463–65.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 15

902

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

coverage for the health benefits service package.”135 The apparent effect
of this mandate would be to require the General Assembly to appropriate
adequate funds to accommodate the newly eligible population. Leaving
no discretion for the General Assembly to determine whether to fund
Medicaid expansion in the first place, Article IV, Section 36(c) would
violate Article III, Section 51.136
In a similar rationale to the Cady court,137 the Supreme Court of
Missouri in Doyle attempted to harmonize this conflict by holding that the
General Assembly retained its discretion as to the appropriation of funds
to MO HealthNet despite Article IV, Section 36(c)’s plain mandate.138
The court’s logic is sweeping and, seemingly, allows the General
Assembly to “decide whether and to what extent” to “appropriate money
for MO HealthNet programs.”139 At first glance, the court could have been
referring to the General Assembly’s discretion to decide whether Missouri
participates in Medicaid at all. Missouri, like all states since 1982,
participates in Medicaid voluntarily and could opt out of the program at
any time.140 The court seemed to suggest that, because the General
Assembly retains that threshold choice,141 Article IV, Section 36(c)
removes none of the General Assembly’s discretion and comports with the
requirement of Article III, Section 51.142
135

MO. CONST. art. IV, § 36(c).
Generally, this is what the trial court held. Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at 463.
Considering the political unfeasibility of withdrawing form Medicaid altogether, the
initiative which became Article IV, Section 36(c) “indirectly require[ed] the
appropriation of revenues not created by the initiative and is therefore unconstitutional
under Article III, section 51 of the Missouri Constitution.” Doyle v. Tidball, 2021 WL
2619499, *3 (Mo. Cir. Ct.), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 625 S.W.3d 459 (Mo. 2021)
(en banc).
137
Cady v. Ashcroft, 606 S.W.3d 659, 668–69 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020).
138
Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at 465.
139
Id.
140
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 542 (2012).
141
Although the trial court seemingly disagreed. Doyle, 2021 WL 2629499 at
*2 (“Were there no Medicaid program currently funded, Amendment 2 would require
the creation of one for its beneficiaries.”) (emphasis added).
142
There is a question, however, as to whether the General Assembly has a
realistic choice of whether to participate in Medicaid or not. Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at
460. Considering Medicaid’s established role in Missouri healthcare and state budget,
it seems at least arguable that if the General Assembly has a choice, it is in name only.
Id. In a quintessential Hobson’s choice, the General Assembly would effectively be
asked to either take away the state’s largest medical insurer or fund Medicaid
expansion in Missouri. Id. Considering Medicaid’s entrenchment in Missouri
healthcare and the importance of MO HealthNet benefits to thousands of Missourians,
the General Assembly opting out of Medicaid is, at best, far-fetched. Id. If the choice
made at the discretion of the General assembly is really no choice at all, then the
General Assembly’s discretion has effectively been removed in violation of Article
III, Section 51. Id.
136
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The court’s language regarding the General Assembly’s discretion as
to what extent it appropriates funds for MO HealthNet, however, is more
problematic. The court’s holding, which permits the General Assembly –
should it choose to continue participating in Medicaid at all – to fund MO
HealthNet to the extent it deems fit, seriously threatens the rights of
eligible individuals to coverage and benefits. But, to be clear, the threat
does not come about simply because the General Assembly retains some
discretion.143 Rather, the threat lies in the extent to which the Republicanled General Assembly, which sharply resisted the initiative before its
passage and has been critical of it since its enactment, would opt not to
fund it at all or in inadequate measure.144
With no funding requirement in Article IV, Section 36(c) and total
discretion left to the General Assembly, there is little to stop it from
intentionally underfunding the program.145 What, then, are eligible
individuals to do? Should they hope that when they need coverage
Republicans do not control the General Assembly? Such a stance is as
bleak as it is politically unlikely. Given the prominence of Republicans in
the General Assembly, it begs the question: what are newly eligible
Missourians to do if the General Assembly opts to provide inadequate
funding for MO HealthNet or even to not fund it at all?
Therein lies the problem. By side-stepping these questions,146 the
court’s opinion in Doyle left 275,000 newly eligible Missourians, as well

143
For example, the General Assembly does and should have some discretion as
to, among other things, administration costs. Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at 465. In running the
MO HealthNet program, the General Assembly could use its discretion in
appropriating funds for certain software programs, the kind of printers used in the
office, etc. Id. Everyday discretionary spending judgments, which the General
Assembly routinely makes, are not the concern. Id.
144
Cameron Gerber, Missouri Treasurer, GOP Lawmakers Rally Against
Medicaid
Expansion,
THE
MISSOURI
TIMES,
(Jul.
27,
2020),
https://themissouritimes.com/missouri-treasurer-gop-lawmakers-rally-againstmedicaid-expansion/ [https://perma.cc/V879-HM23]; Valdivia, supra at note 16.
145
In fact, there is evidence that it is currently happening. Tessa Weinberg,
Lawmakers Say Special Session Likely Unneeded to Fund Missouri Medicaid
Expansion,
MISSOURI
INDEPENDENT
(Aug.
11,
2021),
https://missouriindependent.com/2021/08/11/lawmakers-say-special-session-likelyunneeded-to-fund-missouri-medicaid-expansion/
[https://perma.cc/87NB-YH4P].
After the circuit court’s order on remand, Missouri Governor Mike Parson stated:
We all know what the obstacle is. We don’t have the funding to
support it right now. So we’ve got to figure out. . . whether we’re
going to dilute the pool of money that we have now for the people
that’s on the program, and just how we’re going to move forward.
Id.
146
Doyle, 625 S.W.3d at 467 n.4.
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as the pre-expansion eligible population,147 wondering whether they have
a right to health care coverage under Article IV, Section 36(c) or if their
health care coverage is merely subject to the whim of a profoundly partisan
Missouri legislature.148
The court seemingly came to this conclusion to avoid a constitutional
conflict with Article III, Section 51 and to give effect to the Medicaid
expansion the people voted to enact. Though this was a legitimate end,
the court has created another – and potentially more serious –
constitutional quagmire. In effect, the court told newly eligible
individuals, “You shall receive MO HealthNet coverage and benefits, if,
that is, the General Assembly decides to pay for it.” There is either an
absolute right to MO HealthNet coverage under Article IV, Section 36(c)
or a conditional right, subject to the General Assembly's discretion to fund
the program. It cannot, and should not, be both.
Precisely because of this ambiguity, the court may soon encounter
this issue again. Republican members of the Missouri legislature have
made no secret of their disdain for Medicaid expansion.149 Even before
the election, Republican legislators were considering measures to allow
the General Assembly to avoid funding some of the expansion
population.150 But for the opinion in Doyle, members of the legislature
who expressed opposition to expansion may have successfully avoided
funding the voter-approved expansion at all.151 In recent months the
General Assembly has even attempted to replace Article IV, Section 36(c)
with a bill – HJR 117 – which would allow the General Assembly to
determine annually whether to fund the newly eligible MO HealthNet

147

Because the court found House Bills 10 and 11 did not distinguish between
the previously and newly eligible populations, the effects of underfunding could
potentially be felt by both previously eligible individuals and those eligible only by
virtue of Article IV, Section 36(c). Id.
148
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[https://perma.cc/3CMD-GULA].
149
See, e.g., Austin Huguelet, Missouri Voters Could Expand Medicaid, Then
Let Lawmakers Block It On The Same Ballot, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (May 12,
2020), https://www.news-leader.com/story/news/2020/05/11/could-gop-resolutionblock-medicaid-expansion-missouri/3108394001/ [https://perma.cc/K7M2-GMJV].
150
Id.
151
Phil McCausland, Missouri Governor Won’t Fund Medicaid Expansion,
Flouting State Constitution and Voters, NBC NEWS (May 13, 2021),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/missouri-governor-won-t-fundmedicaid-expansion-flouting-state-constitution-n1267265 [https://perma.cc/5UCGZ3KJ]; Reid Wilson, Missouri Abandons Voter-Approved Medicaid Expansion, THE
HILL (May 13, 2021), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/553352-missouriabandons-voter-approved-medicaid-expansion [https://perma.cc/W63J-VVB2].
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population.152 Given the established anti-expansion stance of Missouri
Republicans, this would likely be a choice in name only. As long as it
remains politically expedient, it would seem that the newly eligible
population would be routinely denied Medicaid coverage.153 If the
General Assembly remains indignant, even if HJR 117 fails, it could use
its appropriation discretion consistent with Doyle to undermine the thrust
of Article IV, Section 36(c) and welcome another constitutional challenge
from an eligible individual who is unable to receive MO HealthNet
benefits.
In the months following Doyle, Missouri received a sneak peek of the
potential problems caused by an underfunded MO HealthNet. Despite the
court’s August 2021 order to begin enrolling eligible individuals,
enrollment was largely unavailable until October.154 According to the
Governor’s August 11, 2021 press release, the delays were attributable to
the General Assembly’s failure to include “sufficient staffing or
appropriations” to implement Medicaid expansion effectively.155 By
October 2021, the delays and inadequate staffing provisions resulted in
only 4,300 of the more than 17,000 total applicants successfully enrolling
in MO HealthNet.156 Other roll-out problems like this have continued to
bog down enrollment numbers.157 To date, an approximate total of
183,000 Missourians have enrolled in the MO HealthNet program.158
While a significant uptick since October 2021, MO HealthNet enrollment
152
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still lags behind other similarly situated states that also passed Medicaid
expansion in 2020. For example, in roughly the same time period,
Oklahoma has enrolled over 250,000 people in its Medicaid expansion
plan.159 Ultimately, enrollment delays like this, potential denials of MO
HealthNet benefits due to inadequate funding, and other future problems
arising from an underfunded MO HealthNet may further the enrollment
gap and operate as a bar for many low-income individuals from receiving
the health care they badly need.
In the end, the Supreme Court of Missouri faced a difficult choice in
Doyle v. Tidball. On one hand, the people of Missouri, in their wisdom,
unequivocally sought to mandate that eligible populations shall be eligible
and shall receive MO HealthNet coverage.160 On the other, Article III,
Section 51 clearly prohibits appropriation-by-initiative. By finding
Article IV, Section 36(c) constitutional, the court weaved its logic around
Article III, Section 51’s prohibition without completely addressing the
potential problems with unfettered General Assembly discretion. While
Medicaid expansion, in many ways, is socially desirable, the court’s
reversal of the trial court created an ambiguity as to whether Medicaid
coverage will actually be available to those the Missouri Constitution now
says “shall receive” it. Eligible Missourians either have the right to MO
HealthNet benefits or not. If Missourians have an absolute right, as the
plain text of Section 36(c) demands, then the court may again have to
grapple with the constitutionality of Article IV, Section 36(c)’s restriction
of the General Assembly’s appropriation discretion.
If eligible
Missourians only possess a conditional right to MO HealthNet benefits,
subject to the General Assembly’s discretion, then the court, or ideally the
Missouri legislature, must find a solution for the underfunding problem.
Despite an effort to harmonize a seemingly irreconcilable conflict
with Article III, Section 51, the court may have created another, possibly
more significant constitutional question: what happens when an eligible
person, whom the Missouri Constitution declares “shall receive coverage
for the health benefits service package,” is not able to access that coverage

159
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Comm'rs of City of St. Louis, 259 S.W.3d 526, 528 (Mo. 2008) (en banc)).
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because the General Assembly fails to adequately fund the program? The
Supreme Court of Missouri may soon be forced to answer.

VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the good policy rationale and voter support behind expanding
Medicaid in Missouri, the Supreme Court of Missouri failed to wholly
address the problems that may occur as a result of the General Assembly’s
discretion over “whether and to what extent” to fund MO HealthNet
expansion. Ultimately, it never had to reach the question, as the adequacy
of future funding was not before it. But, had the court provided guidance
on the issue – which was within their power to do – Missourians would
have a clearer idea of where they stand when it comes to their access to
MO HealthNet benefits.
Of course, if the General Assembly opts to fund Medicaid expansion
adequately and move on to other issues, the question may never come
before the court. That, in truth, may be the best possible outcome. Moving
the political football to another subject could leave the “discretion” versus
“right” tension behind while providing coverage for eligible individuals.
But, regardless of whether the General Assembly continues to fight
Medicaid expansion, the Republican-led body likely has not seen the end
of the large-scale initiative petitions it has been trying to stifle.161 Leading
up to the November 2022 election, amid familiar partisan resistance,
Missouri voters will cast their votes on a number of initiative petitions,
including recreational cannabis use.162 And if those measures ultimately
pass, the court may again have to grapple with how much discretion the
General Assembly has in funding the will of the people.
For now, at least, eligible Missourians will attempt to access the
coverage and care guaranteed to them in Article IV, Section 36(c). . . if the
General Assembly decides to pay up.

161
David Rosman, Proposal to Change Initiative Petitions in Missouri is a
Threat
to
Democracy,
COLUMBIA
MISSOURIAN
(Apr.
7,
2021),
https://www.columbiamissourian.com/opinion/local_columnists/proposal-to-changeinitiative-petitions-in-missouri-is-a-threat-to-democracy/article_63edcedc-970111eb-adec-07120a7a45b0.html [https://perma.cc/9PJS-9Y3Z].
162
2022 Ballot Measures, MISSOURI SECRETARY OF STATE (2008),
https://www.sos.mo.gov/default.aspx?PageID=10056
[https://perma.cc/D8NCJEG7] (last visited August 29, 2022).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

23

